ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ Δρα ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΥ.Ε.ΔΡΟΥΓΟΥ ΓΙΑ ΕΠΙΚΑΙΡΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΑ ΔΙΠΛΩΜΑΤΙΚΑ-ΔΙΕΘΝΗ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΑ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ.

*ΕΙΔΙΚΕΣ ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ ΜΟΥ ( ΤΟΥ 2011) ΕΠΙ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΩΝ  ΘΕΜΑΤΩΝ ΣΤΑΔΙΑΚΑ ΔΙΝΩ ΣΤΗΝ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΤΗΤΑ.( ΑΠΟ ΦΕΒΡΟΥΑΡΙΟ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΑΠΡΙΛΙΟ)

*ΠΡΟΚΕΙΤΑΙ ΓΙΑ 52 ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ (ΤΩΝ 30-60 ΣΕΛΙΔΩΝ ) ΜΕ ΠΟΛΛΕΣ ΠΡΟΤΑΣΕΙΣ-ΕΚΤΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΔΙΚΕΣ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΕΣ ΠΗΓΕΣ.

*ΟΙ ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ  ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ ΕΝ ΟΨΕΙ ΣΟΒΑΡΩΝ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΩΝ ΣΕ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΛΑΝΗΤΗ.

*ΤΟ ΚΟΣΤΟΣ ΚΑΘΕ ΜΕΛΕΤΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΟΝ  ΠΑΡΑΛΗΠΤΗ  ΑΝΕΡΧΕΤΑΙ ΣΤΑ 100-150 ΕΥΡΩ./ΑΝΑΛΟΓΑ ΜΕ ΤΟ ΘΕΜΑ-ΕΙΔΙΚΕΣ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ-ΕΥΡΟΣ ΜΕΛΕΤΗΣ.

*ΣΕ ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΗ ΤΑΧΥΔΡΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΗΣ ΘΑ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΥΠΟΛΟΓΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΕΞΟΔΑ ΕΠΙΒΑΡΥΝΣΗΣ/ΑΣΦΑΛΩΣ ΜΠΟΡΟΥΝ ΝΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΑΛΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΟΝΙΚΑ.

*ΕΙΔΙΚΕΣ ΤΙΜΕΣ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΥΝ ΓΙΑ  ΠΑΡΑΛΗΠΤΕΣ ΑΝΩ ΤΩΝ 3 ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ.(250 ΕΥΡΩ). ΟΙ 5 ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ 400 ΕΥΡΩ.

ΠΑΡΑΘΕΤΩ ΤΑ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΜΟΥ:

1)TO ΠΑΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΜΕΛΛΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΤΙΠΥΡΑΥΛΙΚΗΣ ΑΜΥΝΑΣ/ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ-ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ-ΝΑΤΟ ΣΤΗΝ ΝΑ. ΕΥΡΩΠΗ.

2)Η ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ ΚΟΡΥΦΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΤΟ ΣΤΟ ΣΙΚΑΓΟ/ΜΑΙΟΣ 2012 ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΚΑΥΤΑ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΜΕΛΛΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΑΣ.

3)ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ-ΕΚΤΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΙΣ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΤΟ ΣΤΗΝ ΛΙΒΥΗ.

4)ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ ΕΚΤΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΚΑΤΑΔΡΟΜΙΚΕΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΗΠΑ  ΣΕ Μ.ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ-ΑΦΡΙΚΗ.

5)ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ ΕΚΤΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΑΦΓΑΝΙΣΤΑΝ ΓΙΑ ΗΠΑ-Μ.ΒΡΕΤΑΝΙΑ-ΓΑΛΛΙΑ.

6)ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΣΤΟΝ ΑΡΚΤΙΚΟ ΚΥΚΛΟ. ΤΑ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΠΟΥ ΕΡΧΟΝΤΑΙ….

7)ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΦΡΙΚΗ. ΑΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΕΣ ΑΠΕΙΛΕΣ.

8)ΕΥΡΥΤΕΡΕΣ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΤΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΤΕΙΑ ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑΚΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΦΡΙΚΗΣ.

9)ΑΡΑΒΙΚΗ ΑΝΟΙΞΗ. ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ. ΕΝΟΣ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ.

10)ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΑΒΙΚΗ ΑΝΟΙΞΗ. ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ ΣΕ ΒΑΘΟΣ.

11)ΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΑ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ ΣΤΑ ΒΑΛΚΑΝΙΑ.

12)ΤΑ ΣΕΝΑΡΙΑ ΕΠΙΘΕΣΗΣ ΣΤΙΣ ΠΥΡΗΝΙΚΕΣ ΒΑΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΙΡΑΝ. ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ.

13)ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΟΣΑΜΑ ΜΠΙΛ ΛΑΝΤΕΝ ΤΙ;

14)ΟΙ ΕΚΛΟΓΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟ. ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ. ΤΙ  ΜΠΟΡΟΥΜΕ ΝΑ ΠΕΡΙΜΕΝΟΥΜΕ.

15)ΑΛ ΚΑΕΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΡΙΖΟΣΠΑΣΤΙΚΟ ΙΣΛΑΜ ΣΕ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ-Μ.ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ-ΑΦΡΙΚΗ.

16)ΟΠΛΑ ΜΑΖΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ. ΟΙ ΑΠΕΙΛΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΕΡΧΟΝΤΑΙ.

17)0ΠΟΙΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ Η ΑΝΤΙΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΣΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΣΥΡΙΑ. ΜΙΑ ΕΝΔΟΣΚΟΠΗΣΗ.

18)ΕΠΕΜΒΑΣΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΣΥΡΙΑ. ΘΕΤΙΚΑ-ΑΡΝΗΤΙΚΑ.

19)ΟΙ ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΣ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΕΣ ΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ ΣΕ ΑΣΙΑ-ΕΙΡΗΝΙΚΟ.

20)ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΣΤΟΝ ΚΟΛΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΤΡΕΛΑΙΩΝ. ΣΤΕΝΑ ΤΟΥ ΟΡΜΟΥΖ ΚΑΙ ΙΡΑΝΙΚΕΣ ΑΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΕΣ ΑΠΕΙΛΕΣ.

21) Ο ΡΟΛΟΣ ΤΑ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΣΤΟ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ ΣΤΕΡΕΩΜΑ. ΠΩΣ ΕΚΜΕΤΑΛΛΕΥΕΤΑΙ ΤΑ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ ΣΕ Μ.ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ-ΑΦΡΙΚΗ-ΒΡΑΖΙΛΙΑ ΚΛΠ.

22)ΤΟ ΝΑΤΟ ΚΑΙ Η ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΙΡΑΝ.

23)10 ΧΡΟΝΙΑ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΗ 9/11. ΤΙ ΕΓΙΝΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΓΙΝΕ.

24)ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ ΑΠΟ ΨΗΛΑ…Ο ΡΟΛΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΜΗ-ΕΠΑΝΔΡΩΜΕΝΩΝ ΑΕΡΟΣΚΑΦΩΝ ΣΕ ΚΑΙΡΟ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ-ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΧΙ ΜΟΝΟ.

25)ΤΟ ΜΕΛΛΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΚΙΣΤΑΝ.

26)ΤΟ ΜΕΛΛΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΝΙΓΗΡΙΑΣ.

27)ΚΥΒΕΡΝΟΧΩΡΟΣ-ΚΥΒΕΡΝΟΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ. ΟΙ ΕΠΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΦΑΣΕΙΣ.

28)ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΗΣ ΤΩ ΗΠΑ ΣΕ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ-ΑΣΙΑ.

29)Ο ΡΟΛΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΙΝΑΣ ΣΕ ΕΠΙΜΕΡΟΥΣ ΔΙΕΘΝΗ ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ.

30)Η ΙΝΔΙΑ ΣΤΟΝ 21^ο ΑΙΩΝΑ.

31)ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΚΑΙ ΝΑΤΟ . ΠΡΟΟΠΤΙΚΕΣ ΕΝ ΜΕΣΩ ΣΦΟΔΡΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ.

32) Ο ΕΛΛΗΝΑΣ ΑΞΙΩΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΣΤΟΝ 21^ο ΑΙΩΝΑ ΕΝ ΜΕΣΩ ΔΡΙΜΥΤΑΤΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ.

33)ΟΙ ΕΠΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΙ….ΥΒΡΙΔΙΚΟΙ-ΑΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΙ.

34)ΓΙΑΤΙ ΤΟ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΔΕΝ ΜΠΟΡΕΣΕ ΝΑ ΣΥΝΤΡΙΨΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΧΕΖΜΠΟΛΛΑΧ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΧΑΜΑΣ.

35)ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΚΩΝ ΑΓΩΓΩΝ.

36)ΣΥΝΟΡΙΑΚΗ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ. ΠΑΡΑΜΕΤΡΟΙ-ΕΠΙΛΟΓΕΣ.

37)ΚΑΡΤΕΛ ΝΑΡΚΩΤΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΚΡΑΤΩΝ. Η ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΗ ΣΤΑ ΣΥΝΟΡΑ ΗΠΑ-ΜΕΞΙΚΟΥ.

38) ΜΥΘΟΠΛΑΣΙΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΛΠΑΖΟΥΣΑ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ ΟΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ  ΣΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΡΩΑΜΥΝΑΣ.

39)ΤΙ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΚΑΝΕΙ Η ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΚΑΙ Η ΚΥΠΡΟΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΗ ΜΕΣΟΓΕΙΟ.

40)ΤΟ ΙΡΑΚ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΠΟΧΩΡΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΩΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ.

41)ΣΧΕΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΤΟ ΜΕ ΟΥΚΡΑΝΙΑ-ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑ-ΡΩΣΙΑ./ΣΗΜΕΡΑ.

42)ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΕΣ ΑΠΕΙΛΕΣ.

43) Η ΝΕΑ ΦΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ ΣΕ ΑΣΤΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΒΑΛΛΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ.

44)ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΣΕ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΜΙΑ ΠΑΡΑΤΕΤΑΜΕΝΗ ΑΠΟΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΣΤΑΤΩΣΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΧΩΡΑ ΜΑΣ.

45)FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NEXT CHAPTERS.

46)H ΠΡΟΣΕΧΗΣ ΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ Β.ΑΦΡΙΚΗΣ ΑΠΕΝΑΝΤΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΧΩΡΑ ΜΑΣ.

47)ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΤΟ ΕΠΙΛΕΚΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΚΑΠΟΙΕΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΣΕ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ.

48)ΕΥΡΥΤΕΡΕΣ ΠΡΟΟΠΤΙΚΕΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΣΧΕΣΕΙΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ-ΙΣΡΑΗΛ.

49)ΜΗΠΩΣ ΑΦΗΣΑΝ ΟΙ ΗΠΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΑ;

50) IΙΔΙΩΤΙΚΕΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΜΑΧΗ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΩΝ-ΠΕΙΡΑΤΩΝ.

51)ΤΟ ΙΡΑΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΛΑΤΙΝΙΚΗ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗ. ΟΙ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ.

52)ΤΟ ΤΖΙΧΑΝΤ ΤΟ 2012. ΤΙ ΛΟΓΙΚΑ ΑΝΑΜΕΝΟΥΜΕ…

EΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ:thdrougos@yahoo.com

Steven A. Cook – Steven A. Cook is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square.

It’s Time to Think Seriously About Intervening in Syria

By Steven A. Cook

Jan 27 2012, The conventional wisdom in Washington and beyond is that Bashar al-Assad will fall on his own and that an intervention would be counterproductive, but with thousands dying we need to reconsider those assumptions

A Syrian protester faces security forces near Homs / Reuters

The most stunning thing about how American foreign policy experts and elites talk about Syria today is the one aspect of the country’s crisis that they won’t discuss. There is little to no actual debate about direct international intervention into an uprising and crackdown that has cost more than 5,000 Syrian lives. In response to the Bashar al-Assad regime’s violence against largely peaceful protesters, which leaves dozens of people dead every day, the international community has denounced Damascus «in the strongest possible terms,» as diplomats like to say, placed the country and its leadership under sanction, and searched for additional punitive measures short of the use of force. Oddly, at the same time that the United States, Europe, and the Arab League have apparently rejected meeting Bashar al-Assad’s violence with violence, there is an assumption in Washington that it is only a matter of time before the Syrian regime falls. It is largely a self-serving hunch that does not necessarily conform to what is actually happening in Syria, but nevertheless provides cover for doing nothing to protect people who are at the mercy of a government intent on using brutality to re-establish its authority. After all, if the many Syrians who have been in open revolt since March of last year are on the verge of bringing down Assad, then, as the conventional wisdom has it, there is no need for a international response and thus no need for an agonizing debate about whether to use force in Syria. But this logic seems less convincing every day, and it might be time to reconsider our assumptions about intervention.

If the world wants to see the end of Assad, it will likely require international intervention

Despite the now prevailing belief in policy circles that it’s only a matter of time until Assad falls, events in Syria suggest otherwise. Since last March, thousands upon thousands of Syrians have taken to the streets, initially to demand reform and now the end of the Assad regime, which they clearly regard as unredeemable. Syrians have been willing to face down a fearsome army and security forces that were created, trained, and equipped not for war with Israel but for repression. The economic power of the United States, European Union, and Turkey (The European Union and Turkey had previously accounted for almost 30 percent of Syria’s trade) have applied what was hoped would be crippling sanctions on Assad. There is evidence that these measures have created a range of problems for Syria, including spikes in food and energy prices. Still, sanctions have failed to modify the regime’s approach to the uprising. Indeed, the Syrian leadership has long shown that it is more than willing to force its people to suffer in order to ensure the regime’s survival.

Syrians are persisting in the face of regime violence and there have been defections from the armed forces. Yet only a small number of officers and recruits have switched sides: the anti-regime Free Syrian Army apparently numbers only a few hundred. Unlike in Tunisia or Egypt during the revolutions there, it seems that Syria’s military officers still believe that sticking with Assad best serves their interests. Even the recent terrorist attacks in Damascus, against high-value targets such as the State Security Directorate and the Kfar Sousa district military office, do not appear to have not altered the regime’s strategy. Indeed, Assad vowed to use an iron fist against the perpetrators of the attacks, which the opposition believes was actually committed by the regime seeking an excuse — as if it needed one — to use force against the uprising.

It’s true that Assad is more isolated than ever, but to what effect? The Turks, who, over the course of the last decade, tried to convince the world that the Syrian leader could be flipped through engagement and trade, have given up on him. Even the Arab League, long a club for dictators, suspended Syria’s membership. It was one thing when the organization kicked out Qaddafi’s Libya, but quite another to take similar action against the country that is «the beating heart» of the Arab world, as Syria is sometimes known. Despite the international opprobrium heaped upon Damascus and efforts to isolate the regime, Assad continues to have options. Tehran, Moscow, Beijing, and Hizballah all remain committed to their relationships with Damascus.

Ultimately, it seems that Assad still has bullets left, people to resupply him when his stocks run low, and loyal officers to fire them. What more does he really need? Under what circumstances is Assad’s fall «only a matter of when and not if,» as the foreign policy comminity seems to have decided? The Syrian leader may, in fact, be under pressure, but he also clearly believes that he has time. In his speech to the Syrian people on January 10, he gave no hint that he believes he has a political problem on his hands. That may be posturing for public and international consumption, but unlike earlier speeches Assad did not even bother to promise hollow reforms. He has gone all in, apparently believing that he can continue to kill people with relative impunity. Current international efforts are exacting a toll, but it is clear that Assad and his associates — his family, actually — are willing pay a much higher price for their survival.

If Assad is indeed more secure than the conventional view suggests, then the inevitable question is whether it is time to consider more «robust» responses to the Syrian regime’s outrages. Much of the commentary thus far has focused on why hypothetical interventions — Operation Unified Protector: Syrian Edition or Lift and Strike Damascus — would be bad ideas. Opponents of international intervention argue that the Syrian opposition has not asked for such action, but their non-consent could be changing, given what living (or not) at the mercy of the Assad regime looks like. The opponents also claim that intervention in Syria is likely to be harder than it was in Libya. On a technical level, the argument is specious. There is nothing in the Syrian arsenal that would pose an undefeatable threat to Western aircrews. That’s not to suggest that undertaking military action in Syria would be a «cakewalk,» but relatively recent Israeli incursions into Syrian airspace suggest that in terms of force protection, the risks are minimal. The technical issue is, however, a red herring. Analysts who reject the idea of airstrikes suggest that it could actually do more harm than good, giving Assad an excuse to kill even more people. It is a compelling argument and certainly a downside risk, but what is constraining the Syrian leadership now? Nothing. And, what is the metric that flips the cost-benefit analysis? In other words, at what point in the body count is international intervention deemed to be an acceptably worthwhile option that can have a positive effect on the situation? After Assad has killed 6,000 people? 7,000? 10, 000? 20,000?

The other major objection to taking direct action against Assad is Iraq. There are two versions of this claim. The first indicates that the experience of Iraq was so searing and the impact on Iraq’s neighbors so devastating, that the United States should not repeat the same mistakes now. But why did this claim have so little sway when it came to Libya? Post-Qaddafi Libya is far from perfect and its future is uncertain, but the intervention was nowhere near at costly or destabilizing as the 2003 Iraq invasion. Regardless, it seems that when it comes to Syria, the Obama administration has learned the lessons of Iraq. For example, in contrast to the George W. Bush administration’s march to war in 2002 and 2003, Washington has worked particularly hard to be mindful of regional security concerns, particularly Turkey’s, in Syria.

There are actually few analogies to the Iraq experience. Unlike Saddam at the time of the invasion, Assad is engaged in the mass killing of his own people; unlike Operation Iraqi Freedom, there is a chance that the Arab League would support a humanitarian intervention in Syria, and any military operations could be undertaken multilaterally. Getting a UN Security Council resolution would be tough given Chinese and especially Russian opposition, but without being too Rumsfeldian, does every military intervention require a UN writ? It is certainly preferable, but not a requirement.

Would Syria really be so different from Libya? This is big question that the opponents of intervention in Syria have not effectively answered. European leaders, «right to protect» advocates, members of Congress, and a bevy of foreign policy intellectuals (with a few notable exceptions) seemed willing to unleash NATO on Qaddafi on humanitarian grounds, but not on Assad. If NATO undertook a military attacks to protect Benghazi from an onslaught, what about Homs? At this point, Assad has killed more people than Qadhafi had on the eve of NATO operations. The truth is that the arguments against bombing Syria run into the Libya buzz saw no matter how often people insist that «Syria is not Libya.» One of the real reasons that observers seem reluctant to consider an intervention in Syria may be because Libya took so long to bring Qaddafi down, which was the unstated but unmistakable goal of NATO’s missions. It was supposed to be a matter of weeks, not seven months. Had Qaddafi fallen last April, it’s easy to see how the same political pressure that contributed to Libya’s intervention could have shifted to demand the same approach in Syria.

The arguments for some sort of lift-and-strike-like policy toward Syria are not without their problems. There are good reasons that contemplating yet more Western violence against yet another Muslim country can (and maybe should) bring a certain queasiness. That said, if the international community wants to see the end of the Assad regime, as virtually everyone claims, then it is likely going to require outside intervention. Nothing that anyone has thrown at Damascus has altered its behavior and the current arguments against intervention do not hold up under scrutiny. If there is no intervention and political will to stop Assad’s crimes remains absent, the world will once again have to answer for standing on the sidelines of a mass murder. It is also hard to ignore the possibility that bringing down Assad would advance the long-standing American goal of isolating Iran. Any post-Assad government in Damascus would not likely look to Iran for support, but instead to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. That would be a net benefit for Washington and others looking to limit Iran’s influence in the Arab world.

The wild card in the bomb-Syria-for-humanitarian-reasons argument is what post-Assad Syria might actually look like. Syria has similar ethnic and sectarian complexities as Lebanon and Iraq and there is reason to believe that, in the vicissitudes of politics, these groups might seek to settle scores against one another and to gain advantage through violence. Then again, it is worth asking whether analysts are over-correcting as a result of the American experience in Iraq. Given recent history there, it certainly seems that caution is warranted, but that means leaving Syrians to their fate with a regime which seems intent on shooting and torturing its way out of its present troubles.

Syria has become a place where violence, colonial legacies, the mistakes of the recent past, and the hopes for a better Middle East have collided to create layers of complications and unsettling trade-offs for policymakers and outside observers. Yet wrapping oneself in the false comfort that Assad cannot hang on for long seems like the worst possible way to proceed. Washington and the rest of the international community must come to grips with the idea of intervention in Syria or get used to the idea that Bashar al-Assad could stick around far longer than anyone expects.

January 27, 2012

THE FREE SYRIAN ARMY BLEEDS THE ASSAD REGIME

By Jeffrey White

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The growing Free Syrian Army, the armed wing of the popular rebellion, is playing an increasing role in determining the Assad regime’s future.

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The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is now engaged in combat in at least six of the country’s fourteen governorates, inflicting greater losses on regime personnel and equipment than at any time since its involvement in the uprising began. Both its ranks and its popular support are growing, and its forces have the types of weapons they need for the kind of warfare they are conducting. Although it does not yet threaten the regime’s survival, the militia has at least temporarily forced government troops out of some areas, including near the capital. In short, the FSA is helping to drive the process that will ultimately bring down the regime, and the international community should assist it in doing so.

PROCESSES SHAPING THE FSA

Regime security and military personnel continue to defect to the FSA, primarily in small groups of five to twenty men, though mass defections of a hundred or more soldiers have been reported as well. These incoming forces feed the strength of existing FSA battalions and spur the formation of new units. Most of the defectors are motivated by a desire to avoid killing civilians, fear of retribution for refusing to do so, and broader opposition to the regime itself. Clashes between FSA and government forces are another major catalyst for defections. In addition, some civilians from areas affected by regime operations have joined the FSA; in fact, certain units may simply be autonomous local defense groups operating under the FSA’s name.

Regarding popular support, the failure of other approaches to end the regime’s violence has led growing numbers of Syrians to identify with the FSA. The people appreciate the fact that FSA personnel are present on the streets, are actively engaging regime forces, and are willing to take losses in the process.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FORCE DEVELOPMENTS

Media reports and FSA communiques have referred to around 37 named «battalions,» 17-23 of which appear to be actively engaged in combat. This represents an increase from late November, when 20-22 total battalions reportedly existed and 16-20 were estimated to be active in combat.

In addition, the FSA has claimed to have as many as 40,000 personnel, up from 20,000 in November. These are likely exaggerations, however. Assuming (generously) that the nominal strength of an FSA battalion is 100-200 troops, and that all 37 named battalions do in fact exist, a more reasonable estimate would be 4,000-7,000. That would still represent a substantial increase from November’s assessment.

The FSA acquires some arms through defectors, while others are captured, smuggled, and even purchased from regime army forces. It seems to have no shortage of small arms and light crew-served weapons, including assault rifles, medium machine guns, standard rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and scoped/sniper rifles. The FSA also claims to be employing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against regime vehicles, and videos have corroborated this. In addition, it has begun using vehicles for tactical troop movement, equipped with improvised armor and machine guns.

The most significant arms development may be the FSA’s acquisition of advanced antitank weapons capable of destroying even the most heavily armored regime vehicles. The FSA claims to have used an RPG-29 to destroy a regime BMP infantry fighting vehicle in Deraa, and several videos suggest it has guided antitank missiles as well.

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

FSA activities are concentrated in the governorates of Idlib, Hama, Homs, Rif Dimashq, Deraa, and Deir al-Zour. Of the some than 180 reported clashes between early November and late January, about one-third occurred in Idlib governorate, and about a quarter in Deraa. Clashes have increased significantly in the Rif Dimashq governorate, including suburbs of the capital itself (e.g., Douma and Saqba).

At times, FSA units have openly operated in the streets of Idlib governorate and the cities of Homs, Hama, and Zabadani, and they have managed to establish control over some small areas (e.g., parts of Homs and Zabadani itself). Their most common operations include attacking regime positions (primarily checkpoints), defending demonstrators and local areas, and ambushing regime forces.

The scope and intensity of the fighting seems to be increasing. Idlib, Deraa, and now Rif Dimashq see multiple clashes weekly. And on January 15-18, Zabadani saw a sustained struggle in which the regime committed at least a brigade-size force, including armor. The FSA inflicted losses on armored vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles, and personnel, spurring the withdrawal of regime units. The militia also seems increasingly capable of conducting coordinated local operations against regime positions, as exemplified by reported multiple attacks on checkpoints in Rastan on January 20 and Deraa on January 23.

IMPACT

The FSA is contributing to the strain on regime forces by requiring them to operate almost continuously and engage in frequent combat. This is in addition to the strain created by hundreds of peaceful civilian demonstrations across the country each week. The regime has been compelled to deploy larger forces and conduct more violent operations, increasing both its losses and the international visibility of its actions. Although attrition of regime personnel is not yet numerically significant, the spectacle of burned-out government vehicles and dead soldiers likely rallies the opposition and decreases morale among regime loyalists. Moreover, the movement of government forces has probably become more difficult in Idlib and Deraa, and small-unit/IED attacks on individual vehicles and convoys will further stretch the regime’s resources and increase its loses.

Government forces have not been able to eradicate the FSA in any area. As mentioned previously, the presence of FSA units provides a rallying point for defectors and a boost to local opposition elements, while increased regime violence produces more desertions and seems to generate more units operating under the FSA flag. Personnel wishing to leave the regime’s forces have a place to go, and a synergy is developing between demonstrators and FSA forces.

The FSA still faces major challenges, however. When confronted by massed regime forces, the militia’s units have been unable to resist for long, instead melting away to avoid destruction. FSA battalions seem to fight alone and have not yet demonstrated that they can coordinate operations on a regional basis. It is unclear to what extent the FSA’s command in Turkey exercises real control over operations, other than providing general guidance. It is also uncertain how much freedom of action Turkey allows these commanders. This means that FSA units are essentially conducting independent actions while the regime conducts coordinated operations. Some FSA communiques have mentioned an «Office of Strategic Planning,» suggesting an effort to improve coordination. The militia is also reportedly working to tighten relations with the Syrian National Council in order to better coordinate the opposition’s political and military activities, but the results of this are not yet clear.

IMPLICATIONS

The Assad regime faces a dilemma: the harder it fights, the stronger the opposition — both armed and unarmed — becomes. This contributes to the perception that it is slowly losing control of territory and the situation as a whole.

Meanwhile, the armed and unarmed struggles are reinforcing one another. For example, one recent set of Friday demonstrations was dedicated to the FSA, showing the degree of acceptance it has achieved as the defender of the people. This emerging congruence poses a doubly difficult challenge for the regime. Accordingly, external powers seeking the Assad regime’s fall should recognize and support the FSA, which appears to be an organic extension of the popular rebellion and will assuredly influence the outcome of the struggle in Syria.

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Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant and Iran.

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